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Balancing these considerations, it was estimated that ab-
sorption of a million workers in agriculture and in making good
undermanning in several nonagricultural industries would result
in a 2 percent decline in output per manhour, and that output
per manhour would fall an additional 4 percent due to the re-
duction in munitions output and to disturbances associated
with the transition to peacetime production and a peacetime
labor force. The combined effect of these factors is to reduce
civilian output per manhour 6 percent from the first half of
1945 to the third quarter of 1946.
Weekly hours of work in nonagricultural private employment
were assumed to fall 10 percent from the first half of 1945 to the
fourth quarter of 1946, or from 44.6 to 40 hours per week.
A quarterly index of output per worker, constructed on the
basis of these judgments, was applied to the estimate of output
per worker in the first half of 1945, obtained by dividing gross
national product, minus wage payments to the armed forces
and interest on the public debt, by the estimated civilian em-
ployment. The resulting estimate of output per worker for each
quarter was divided into the adjusted gross national product
for the same quarter to give estimated civilian employment.
The number of persons in the armed forces was estimated on
the basis of demobilization schedules submitted by the military
departments.
The estimated change in the labor force was based on judg-
ment concerning the speed with which the wartime extras would
leave the labor market. Unemployment is then a residual figure,
though in estimating the speed with which wartime 'extra'
workers will leave the labor force, the level of unemployment




Mr. Coim's definition of 'lull employment' as a situation in
which there are at least as many unfilled work vacancies as ap-
plicants for jobs is not satisfactory.' According to this definition,
For Mr. Cohn's definidon,presentedoriginally in discussion, see his reply below.110 PART XI
employment is 'full' if there are 10 million workers out of work
and as many unfilled vacancies; it is not 'full' if there are 2.5
million unemployed and 2.50,000 vacancies. The concept of 'full
employment' is, in this way, divorced from the usual connota-
tion of 'good' employment. Fullness of employment is measured
not by the size of unemployment or its relation to the labor
force, but by the ratio of unemployment to job vacancies. How-
ever, in a country as large and heterogeneous as the United
States there may be, simultaneously, many workers out of work
and many vacancies; for example, mass unemployment among
factory workers and shortage of labor in agriculture and for-
estry; or mass unemployment in the South and shortage of
labor in the West. It is not dear why such a maladjustment be-
tween the demand for labor and the supply of labor force should
be described as 'full employment'.
The postulate of a balance between applications for jobs and
unfilled vacancies rests obviously on the assumption that the
higher the ratio between applications and vacancies the easier
it is for an unemployed worker to find work. From this point of
view, the situation should look gloomy when there are 250,000
vacancies for 2.5 million applicants, and highly satisfactory if
there are 10 million persons out of work and 10 million vacan-
cies. However, a closer analysis of the turnover of employment
and unemployment shows that the number of 'unfilled vacan-
cies'whateverthis term may mean —haslittle to do with
the opportunity an unemployed worker has of finding work.
What counts is the number of accessions, i.e., actual hirings per
unit of time,.say per week. If there were U workers out of work
at the beginning of the week and the number of separations and
accessions during the week are designated by s and a
tively, the chance an unemployed worker has of finding a job
during that week may be measured roughly as Ii
a
The U+s
number of unfilled vacancies does not appear in this formula.
'Full' employment should be used synonymously with 'good',
'high', or 'satisfactory' employment. All these terms express
simplyour appraisal of the situation. As a guide for appraisal,
a maximum of tolerable frictional unemployment may be estab-
lished and combined with a measure of the velocity of turnoverCOMMENT 111
ofunemployment or a frequency distribution of jobless workers
by duration of idleness.
Moreover, for the purpose of studies of the Nation's Budget,
another definition of 'full' employment may be preferable. We
may start from the widely recognized fact that both a depres-
sion and a boom cause the labor force to expand. In the event of
a deep depression and mass unemployment, members of fam-
ilies in which the .main breadwinner is idle begin to look for
jobs, and even if they find no work they join the labor force as
unemployed additional workers. In the event of a boom —as
during the war —additionalworkers are recruited among boys
and girls who, under normal conditions, would have been in
school; married women; persons who had retired from the
active labor force because of superannuation; and the like.
Additional workers are not the same in the two cases but the
effect of their influx into the labor market is similar: the labor
force increases with declining employment during a depression
as well as with rising employment during a boom. In mathe-
matical terms the active labor force is a U-shaped function of
the demand for labor.
According to this theory, there must be a state of employ-
ment when the labor force is at a low point; that is, when addi-
tional workers are fewer than they would have been at a higher
or lower level of employment. Characteristic of this employ-
ment level is the largest school attendance, the largest number
of married women who can afford to give all their time to home-
making, the largest number of retired workers. This level may
be described as normal/till employment, and is defined by the
postulate: under full employment the active labor force is at a
minimum.
From this point of view, the number of unfilled vacancies is
irrelevant. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that the labor
force will be at a low point when unemployment reaches a cer-
tain level, neither too high nor too low. It remains to future
research to determine whether this level is 2 million, 2.5 million,
or higher.
The question is of paramount significance in planning for full
employment. The goal is not to maximize jobs but to determine
their number in such a way as to minimize the active labor
force.112 PART H
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The merits and shortcomings of the Nation's Budget method
exemplified by Mr. Hagen's paper should be appraised in the
light of experience..
The aim is to estimate future unemployment; computations
of single items of gross national product are merely steps pre-
liminary to arriving at the unemployment figures shown at the
bottom of Tables 2 and 3..To appraise the method it is enough
to compare the figures in these tables for. the fourth quarter of
1945 with the actual level of unemployment as revealed by the
Bureau of the Census monthly surveys. Hagen predicts for
October—December 1943 unemployment averaging 6.3 million
under both favorable and unfavorable conditions. The Bureau
of the Census recorded 1,520,000 persons out of work in October
and there is no indication that the tide was rising in November
or December. Consequently, the actual level of unemployment
in the fourth quarter of 1945 was probably close to 1.5 million.
For the first quarter of 1946 Hagen predicted unemployment
of 8.1 million in both the 'more' and 'less' favorable projections.
What the Census will show remains to be seen, but many ob-
servers think that labor market conditions in 1946 will be about
the same as in 1945. Even with an allowance for understatement
in the Census figures, Hagen's forecasts seem to be 200 to 300
percent off the beam. Indeed, they suggest mass unemployment
at a time when there is an acute shortage of labor, depression
when there is a boom, deflationary contraction when the entire
system is dominated by inflationary forces. In brief,
the prediction appears wrong on all counts and useless for any
practical purpose.
Moreover, if this is the degree of accuracy of the method for
the next quarter or two, its range of error for the more remote
future must be still larger. The complete failure of the forecast
at the first real test makes pointless further discussion of the
applicability of the Nation's Budget method to estimates of
future unemployment. Only the causes of this fiasco remain to
be investigated.
I think that the errors in the projections have two sources.
First, Mr. Hagen, like other partisans of the Nation's Budget
method, began his computation with a definite conception ofCOMMENT 113
oureconomic perspectives. He knew —orbelieved he knew —
thatthe nation was heading toward a deep depression and mass
unemployment; regression lines, as they always do, confirmed
his apprehension.
The second source of error is in the method itself. Future un-
employment is calculated as the difference between labor force
and employment. A moderate margin of error —sayof ±3 per-
cent —inthe estimate of the labor force means that the future
supply of labor might be estimated with a probable error of
± 2 million. The margin of error in the estimate of future em-
ployment is probably much wider. For gross national product
the margin of error is hardly less than ± 3 percent, and an equal
or larger margin should be allowed for the projection of pro-
ductivity of labor and weekly hours of work. The cumulative
margin of error in the estimate of employment is therefore not
less than ±10 percent, or ±6 million jobs.
Since the errors in the estimate of the labor force and those
in the estimate of employment are not necessarily compensa-
tory, the total margin of error in the forecast of unemployment
by the Nation's Budget method may be as large as ±8 million.
In short, a fairly narrow margin of error in the preliminary
operations means that the final forecast may be 300 or 700 per-
cent out of the way.
Hagen's errors are within this comfortable margin: in fact,
his estimates were 250 percent, or 4.5 million, too high for the
fourth quarter of 1945; they will probably be 400 percent, or
6.1 million, too high in the first quarter of 1946; and even the
prediction of 9.3 million unemployed in spring 1947 may not be
more than 8 million too high.
The method is so inadequate that the most fantastic mistake
comes within its legitimate margin of error.
Much better projections of unemployment might be obtained
by direct analysis of future economic conditions, emphasizing
qualitative characteristics of prevailing trends. Such projections
developed more than two years ago indicated that because of
deferred demand for consumer goods, piled up purchasing
power, postponed investments, and huge business reserves,
there would be sellers' markets in the United States during the
reconversion and for a considerable period after. This general
appraisal of the economic scene implied that manufacturers114 PART H
would have a good chance of selling, with a reasonable profit, as
much merchandise as they could deliver. It was fairly certain
that as long as merchandise was generally short production
would tend to expand, and despite reductions in government
expenditures, the situation would be inflationary. Long before.
the end of the war a direct analysis of economic
showed that the labor force 'set free by the cancellation of war
contracts and demobilization of the armed forces would be
readily absorbed and there would be no mass unemployment
either during the reconversion or in the early phase of the post-
war economy.
This conclusion is confirmed by historical experience: after
each major war, the labor force has been the main bottleneck of
reconversion and economic expansion. In the next year or two,
temporary unemployment may be large in certain strategic
areas and frictional unemployment appreciable in the rest of the
nation, but expectations of mass unemployment like that dur-
ing periods of economic stagnation are utterly unrealistic. Only
runaway inflation, social turmoil, or the imminent threat of a
new war could reverse the situation and push unemployment
up. In that event, however, unemployment would be high for
reasons that have nothing to do with the factors taken into
account by the Nation's Budget method.
If experience is of any use in appraising projection methods,
this is the record: economists who used direct economic analysis
for their projections were able to foresee, several years ahead,
the actual pattern of employment and unemployment in the
transition period; those who used the Nation's Budget method,
on the other hand, were responsible for a series of predictions
that turned out to be wrong and misleading.
L. R. NIENSTAEDT
Mr. Woytinsky's remarks about the general approach of the
papers presented by Messrs. Coim and Hagen seemed to me
very much to the point. When going from detail to detail it is
difficult to see one's direction, and as Mr. Woytinsky suggests,
it is the direction that is important. In a forest one sees only
the. trees; to see the forest the first thing to do is to get out of it.
As far as the economic system is concerned, that to me meansCOMMENT 115
to attempt an orientation of the 'system' in relation to some-
thing that is 'not system'. This fequires first of all a clear defi-
nition of what belongs to the system and what does not. Such a
definition must evidently establish delimitations outside. of
which there is no economic activity. In space the delimitation
is a geographical border. In economic functions the delimitation
is the place where and the moment when some physical sub-
stance resting in nature begins to move into the system for some
economic reason. If there is to be no economic activity outside
the limits set, trading (movement of economic values) across
geographical borders is excluded from consideration; in other
words, the system is self-contained and can maintain itself only
by production and trade inside its own geographical bounda-
ries. Its relations with the outside consist in the utilization of
raw materials from nature for productive purposes and the re-
turn of these same materials to nature when the useful objects
they were part of are discarded. From such a point of view the
economic process is a circular process resembling the metabo-
lism of a living organism, and the system as defined is self-
contained only in the sense that it is unrelated to any other
economic system.
It is not unrelated, however, to something that is not system
—naturalresources, for instance. And a little consideration
and observation will demonstrate that although the system is
an economic system it must be under a definite influence of
factors from the outside that are not 'economic' in the usual
sense —lengthof the harvest period, length of day and night,
etc. Further consideration may prove that relations between
some factors inside the system may eventually be determined
by these outside factors. These relations may be truly causal
and very stable because the outside factors persist and are not
influenced by any reactions from the inside factors. They are
given facts to which the system must adapt itself even in an
economic sense. This adaptation may determine trends that
override all short term phenomena, i.e., determine the direction
the system is moving in.
This approach, which allows a clear distinction between truly
primary factors outside the system, or inherent in it, and in-
duced factors, both spontaneous and conscious, inside the sys-
tem, has been developed in my book, Economic Equilibrium,116 PART •II
Employment and Natural Resources (Principia Press, Blooming-
ton, md., 1942).
As regards the full employment bill, I fear the term 'full em-
ployment' as now used is much too ambiguous. Sixty million
jobs is the goal. But what is a job? It is so and so many hours of
work for one year by an individual paid at such and such a
price. Since, in a modern ecbnomy, everyone's work and income
depends upon everyone else's work and income, full employ-
ment becomes a primary concern of 'general welfare'. On the
other hand, respect for the freedom of the individual must ad-
mit the right to refuse the job offered (or 'guaranteed'). Clearly
here is a dilemma of far-reaching consequences. As long as the
right is exercised by only a few individuals at a time, there is no
threat to the general welfare. However, if large segments of the
population all at once exercise their right because they do not
want to accept the jobs offered or 'guaranteed' all guarantees
become absurd. At one extreme of the dilemma the right of re-
fusal annihilates the possibility of a job for every citizen, while
at the other extreme the right to a job for every citizen annihi-
lates the right to strike and the fundamental freedom of the
individual. There was no right to strike in Germany but every-
one was supposed to have a job.
How can this contradiction be solved? What exactly is it
possible to guarantee? Since it will be the economists who have
to answer these questions, they are the first to be concerned.
In view of the fundamental nature of the dilemma, it seems to
me that it would clarify matters considerably if a concept of
employment could be introduced that implies a freedom of
choice between clearly defined consequences. At the same time
such a concept must allow exact quantitative definition and be
susceptible to mathematical manipulation in order exactly to
determine what it is possible to guarantee under such and such
conditions. I believe these requirements are met by what I
would call 'the average chance of finding employment' meaning
by 'employment' a definite number of manhours (a full time
equivalent) any individual in a population of such and such a
size could expect to be employed during a year if he accepted
such and such an average wage rate, etc. For example, if a full
time equivalent is 2,000 hours, an average chance of finding
employment of 1 in 5 means that 20,000,000 in a population ofCOMMENT 117
100,000,000maywork 2,000 hours annually on an average at
such and such an income, or that 40,000,000 may work 1,000
hours at hail that income.
Can such a term be defined? And can its dependence on other
primary factors be established in a truly one-way causal fash-
ion? I think so; at least as far as physical production is con-
cerned. This was attempted in my book where it is shown, for
instance, that the average chance of finding employment
(3,310 manhours per annum) in physical production in the
American economy declined from 1 in 5 to 1 in 8 between 1901
and 1929. This result is deduéed independently from observa-
tion of interrelations between primary factors, then verified by
statistical criteria. So far nothing has been done on the chances
of employment in trade and services.
CLARK WARBURTON
The methodology currently used by econometric model-builders
for estimating the future size of gross national product is essen-
tially that of comparing the size of the parts of a whole with the
size of the whole. The logic seems to be:
The whole is made up of its parts —inthe case under discus-
sion, three principal parts;
Certain relations have been found by experience between the
size of the whole and the size of certain parts;
The size of the remaining parts has been found by experience to
be related to the size of the whole and to the size of other
parts;
Therefore, if we know the size of certain parts we can estimate
the size of the whole;
Therefore, the size of the whole causally depends upon the ob-
served relations between certain parts and the whole;
Ergo, by swelling the size of certain parts, corresponding
changes are produced in the size of the whole.
This basic methodology has as much applicability to scien-
tific problems in a wide range of fields as to the problem of fore-
casting the value of national output. One field in which it has
been widely applied is that of anthropology, the specific problem
being estimation of the size of a body from the length or dimen-
sions of one or a few bones. However, this anthropological118 PART II
application involves only the first four steps in the foregoing
sequence. I wonder what the anthropologists would think of
the fifth and sixth steps.
Let me take another analogy. If we measure a large number
of plants we will probably find, for each species, typical rela-
tions between the lengths of the longest root, the stalk, and the
head —thesum of the three being the total length of the plant.
As long as these relations hold, if we can find some hormone
Ibelieve such a hormone has in fact been found —tomake the
roots grow longer, we can expect to have taller plants. But when
we turn to the real world and want to know why crops in Okla-
homa were not as tall in 1934 and 1935 as in previous years, is
this kind of analysis helpful? Rainfall statistics might conceiv-
ably be more significant. Or, if we want to guard against recur-
rence of such a situation, an irrigation project or a rain con-
trolling device (if we have the 'know-how') might be of more
practical use than a hormone factory.
The Budget Bureau and Mr. Hagen do not lean as heavily
as other economic forecasters on the practice of stimulating
growth by means of hormones. From current data they develop
forecasts of the major constituents of gross national product by
noting the short—run trends in the relative size of roots, stalks,
and heads of the plants that have been grown in the fields during
the last year or two or are still growing (a method essentially
similar to that of the Department of Agriculture in forecasting
crops in a given year). They give some attentioon also to the
methods of cultivation and kinds of fertilizer that have been
applied to the fields and appraise their lirobable effects. This
methodology, nevertheless, is based upon essentially the same
logic as that of the model-builders. The Budget Bureau and the
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion apparently as-
sume that they are faced with the problem of deciding upon the
strength of the hormone concentrate that should be applied in
order that the crops this year or next will be up to standard.
They ignore, however, the possibility that the probable rainfall
during the next year and the water table resulting from the
rainfall of the past few years may have sufficient relevance to
the problem to be given specific consideration.
Also, I would like to point out that, even though we were not
sure that we knew how to do so, in 1913 (with some improve-COMMENT 119
mentsin 1917) we built a rain-controlling device that has
proved to be exceedingly effective —soeffective indeed that in
the early 1930's it gave us and the whole world the greatest
economic drought recorded in history and during the last two
years has given us greatly excessive moisture. More attention
should be devoted to the current operations of this rain-con-
trolling device, which have a great deal of relevance to the
problems toward which the analyses of Mr. Hagen and the
Bureau of the Budget are directed.
Finally, I would like to make two suggestions regarding re-
search on the variability of consumer and business spending.
First, if the mathematically-inclined makers of economic models
would combine with the classical general-equilibrium theory of
a static economy the equally traditional, respectable, and un-
refuted theory of unneutral money, they would have a theory
of a dynamic or moving equilibrium that might give them a
good exercise in applied mathematics and would provide the
theoretical basis for the construction of models with some re-
semblance to reality.
Second, if the economists who are interested in full employ-
ment under a system of private enterprise would look at the
cases in the past where relatively full employment has been
achieved for a few years and then lost, they might discover the
conditions essential for the maintenance of full employment
without government deficits. Tf, for example, they would look
carefully at the data for the 192 0's and early 1930's, they would
find that during the 1920's, when we had a relatively high level
of production and a moderately stable price level, the average
rate of growth in the money supply was about 5 percent per
year, but that this growth was stopped in the early part of 1928
and after two or three years of irregular slight decline was fol-
lowed by a precipitate contraction. Such facts as these might
lead to the conclusion that it was impossible for business and
individuals to maintain their expenditures in line with increas-
ing productive capacity without drastic changes in monetary
habits, rather than to the conclusionembraced by the Keyn-
esians but repugnant to common sense —thatthe depression
was ushered in by a change in monetary habits in the form of a
sudden and great reluctance of business and individuals to
spend the money in their possession. The facts regarding the120 PART II
stability or erraticism of monetary habits, I suggest, have con-
siderable relevance to the problem of estimating the adequacy
of demand for potential postwar output and to the govern-
mental policies that are necessary and desirable for full em-
ployment in an economy of free consumer choice and private
enterprise.
MORRIS A. COPELAN-D
Mr. Colm concludes that our present economic understanding
and statistical proficiency enable us to forecast business con-
ditions with sufficient accuracy to implement the Murray Bill.
While he does not make this clear, it would seem that his con-
clusion is meant to apply to forecasts of business conditions for
a year and a half ahead. Thus Hagen's forecast extends forward
for seven quarters from August 1945.
Two questions not really discussed by Mr. Coim or Mr.
Hagen would seem pertinent to such a conclusion: What eco-
nomic expedients to maintain full employment does the Murray
Bill contemplate and what types of forecast does each call for?
Among these various types of forecast, which are we able to do
most effectively today?
It is suggested that the expedients contemplated by the
Murray Bill call for the following types of forecast, among
others:
(1) At how much, if any, below a full employment level is
our economy likely to be operating during the next eighteen
months unless specific new measures to raise the level are taken?
(This type of forecast is presumably called for annually.)
(2)Is there any likelihood that with the types of private
pecuniary motivation now in force and in the absence of a large
public expenditure program we will be able to achieve and
maintain approximately full employment during any, say, four
successive years after about 1950? (A single-time official plus-
or-minus forecast of this sort might implement the private-
sphere provisions of the Murray Bill. However, any major
actual or prospective change in the structure of private pe-
cuniary motivation would be an appropriate occasion for a
revised forecast.)
(3) Assuming that a 'shelf' of expenditure programs is to be
accumulated, what are the dimensions of the prospective deficitCOMMENT 121
in the national production and expenditure budget it should be
designed to meet ? 1Thatis, how sharp, how deep, and how
prolonged a depression should we be prepared for? Such a fore-
cast is needed in answering questions such as how large should
the shelf be? How large a volume of expenditure programs
could be put into operation in how short a time and how nearly
ready-to-go should projects be before admitting them to the
shelf? What should be the composition of the shelf and the type
of arrangements for activating included projects? (While such
a forecast would need revision from time to time, it is not clear
that annual revision is called for.)
(4) Are business prospects for the next nine months such as
to make checks on further expansion or business stimulants
advisable? (This plus-or-minus type of forecast is presumably
needed on a quarterly or more frequent basis and separately
for each of several major segments of business.)
We may apply our second question first —whichof these
four types of forecast are we able to do most effectively today?
Type (2) is the easiest forecast in its absolute form. Model anal-
ysis is clearly pertinent broadly to this type of forecast, but
this plus-and-minus variety of forecast in its absolute form
might equally be made on the simple basis that depressions are
likely to recur unless we take steps to prevent them. However,
when it comes to forecasting whether some proposed structural
change will eliminate depressions, the difficulty of forecast is
increased; if the proposed change is a major one, very greatly
increased.
Type (3) is certainly a forecast we can do today. Although
quantitative, it calls only for fixing limits on the various dimen-
sions of the prospective deficit against which a shelf is to be
accumulated: a safe minimum annual rate of shelf-project ex-
penditure to provide for; a safe minimum period for which to
provide this rate; and a safe minimum time in which to achieve
'Bya 'shelf' is here meant a file of lawful projects, public and private, such that
(a) the activation of each cans within limits known to a central authority, be ma-
terially delayed until the go-ahead signal is given or be materially advanced, and
(b) each can be counted upon to get into actual production according to a schedule
beginning after a certain interval subsequent to notice of activation. The shorter the
interval the shorter the forecast of Type 4 needed for drawing upon the file. If the
interval is to be known by the activating authority, an advance commitment of funds
will probably be necessary.122 PART U
this rate. The chief problem is how to compromise between
limits generous enough to be statistically fairly safe and limits
modest enough so that it will be politically expedient and ad-
ministratively feasible to achieve the shelf.
Type (4) is not properly a simple plus-or-minus forecast, as
the term 'steering-wheel policy' suggests; checks may be needed
in some directions and stimulants in others at the same time so
that several plus-or-minus forecasts are needed for each quarter.
Nonetheless, it is much easier than Type (1); partly because it
is a plus-or-minus forecast for each significant direction. But
the fact that nine months instead of eighteen will suffice for
most purposes is also important. Colm has drawn a distinction
between 'primary' and 'induced' components in a GNP projec-
tion. It seems clear that the primary components would ordi-
narily constitute a larger proportion of the total GNP for a
nine month than for an eighteen month projection. Some com-
ponents that should be regarded as 'induced' for purposes of a
longer-term forecast should be regarded as 'primary' for pur-
poses of a shorter-term forecast. Hagen does not seem to have
taken full advantage of this fact, perhaps because the problem
of doing so was complicated by the special conditions of the
transition period. It seems fair to say that in general we are far
better able today to do a Type (4) than a Type (1) forecast.
Usually an accurate and useful Type (4) forecast is easy. The
real difficulty comes in 'calling the turns'. And if the turns can-
not always be called nine months in advance, to call one three
or four months in advance is far better than to wait until the
turn has taken place.
Now as to our first question: for what economic expedients is
each type of forecast useful? Type (2) is essential in connection
with the adoption of any proposed structural change to pro-
mote full employment. It is essential also in connection with
the adoption of any flexible policy, whether flexible tax rates,
flexible credit policy, flexible expenditures, or what-have-you.
Type (4) is essential in connection with the proper operation of
any flexible policy, and Type (3)inconnection with the proper
operation of a flexible expenditure program. Type (1)is in-
triguing from the viewpoint of economic theory, and in con-
junction with other features of the Murray Bill has certain
political advantages. But its appropriateness to any specificCOMMENT 123
economicexpedient is by no means clear. The most difficult and
least needed type of forecast seems to have received an undue
share of attention.
As a corollary of the above considerations it may be urged
that it is advisable both to adapt our efforts at forecasting to
the requirements of a full employment program and to adapt
our full employment program to what is known regarding our
present capacities for various types of forecasting.
MORDECAI EZEKIEL
Mr. Coim's statement concerning the lack of basis for economic
forecasting was apparently directed at efforts to forecast the
general business situation as a whole. As is well known, past
efforts at general business forecasting —suchas those made by
the Harvard Economic Service for many years —havehad
'batting averages' of about 50 percent; that is, the forecasts
were little, if any, better than would have been obtained by
tossing a coin.
Other types qf economic forecasting, such as forecasting de-
velopments, commodity by commodity, in the agricultural
field, have given better hope for success. They are based upon
the large number of agricultural economic studies of factors
determining price, supply, and demand for individual commod-
ities, that have been made since 1915. For more than twenty
years the Department of Agriculture has been publishing an
annual 'Agricultural Outlook Report' in which forecasts are
given of the prospects for individual agricultural commodities
a year or two ahead —forecastscovering prospective shifts in
production, consumption, demand, and prices. As far as they
indicate the general future direction, up or down, their 'batting
average' has been 80—90 percent right.'
The success of this commodity-by-commodity forecasting
service has made it valuable as an economic service to farmers
on which to base their future production programs. In turn, this
realistic and proved knowledge of how the economic factors
work in various agricultural industries made it possible to carry
through the various operations under the Agricultural Adjust-
1OHsV. Wells, 'A Comparison of Outlook Statements with Subsequent Events'
(U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, mimeographed,
Jan. 24, 1930).124 PARTII
ment Act and subsequent agricultural control legislation in the
light of what the controlling economic elements really were.
Although, as indicated, it is more difficult to forecast the gen-
eral business situation as a whole, many factors of the Nation's
Budget could be forecast by a similar industry-by-industry
analysis. Output of housing and construction, automobiles, and
many other capital goods are determined in part by inherent
cycles or other characteristics of the industries themselves.
Their production and sales, therefore, are not entirely depend-
ent upon the levels of national income as a whole. To the extent
that these individual items in the national budget can be fore-
cast from their own internal industry situations, the accuracy
of the national forecast can be increased, and the projections
of the Nation's Budget given somewhat the same degree of
reliability that the projections of agricultural situations have
had in the past.
REPLY
MR. COLM
The Concept of Full Employment. The of 'full employ-
ment' has been challenged. In response to a question from the
floor I defined 'full employmenè opportunities' as a condition in
which the number of vacancies equals the number of job seek-
ers. Mr. Woytinsky objects to that definition. He says we may
have millions of job seekers and millions of vacancies, but that
would still not be 'full' or 'good' employment if job vacancies
and job seekers do not fit each other because they are in differ-
ent regions or of different types.
Woytinsky proposes to measure the status of employment by
measuring the chances of an unemployed worker to find a job,
and presents a formula: Ii= aand s designate the num- U+s
her of accessions and separations in a unit of time; U, the num-
ber of unemployed workers at the beginning of the unit of time.
Let us test his formula by some hypothetical figures.
Assume that, in case 1, of a 60 million labor force 10 million
are unemployed and 5 million are fired and rehired during the
period. The chance of an unemployed worker finding a job is




Incase 2 the number of unemployed is the same, but we assume
a complete turnover within the employed labor force, namely,




=1:1.2.In case 3 the number of un-
employed is only 1 million and the number of accessions and
separations is assumed to be the same as in case 1, that is,
• . 5
5 million each. In this case then: h3
=1 5
=1:1.2.
This measurement shows an equal approximation to 'full' or
'good' employment in cases 2 and 3 although the unemployed
number 10 million in the one and 1 million in the other. It seems
to me that Woytinsky's formula measures the unemployed
worker's chance of finding a job but neglects to measure the
employed worker's chance of being fired. In this respect I think
his approach fails to measure 'full' as well as 'good' employ-
ment.
Nienstaedt proposes to measure 'the average chance of find-
ing employment', expressing employment by a certain number
of manhours as an equivalent for an individual employed full
time. I think in all our estimates we have actually been using
manyears in measuring the number of employed and unem-
ployed rather than the number of individuals in or out of a job.
Consequently, no one will quarrel with Nienstaedt's proposal
in this respect.
Nienstaedt's formula, if I understand it correctly, merely
expresses employment, measured in terms of manyears, as a
ratio to the population as a whole. I can see its value for depict-
ingtrend, as he does in his book, but I fail to see that his
formula can help in solving the problems he raises with respect
to the purposes of a full employment policy.
Nienstaedt, however, tends to oversimplify our problem
when he assumes that primary physical factors provide a simple
causal relation from which we can determine the quantities of
employment and unemployment. The problem he struggles
with is fundamental to any consideration of the means whereby
full employment can be attained. Physical environmental fac-
tors are of great importance to our society and should be con-
sidered in interpreting the significance of statistics, particularly126 PART H
of dollar figures. However, if physical factors were the primary
and controlling determinants of the level of economic activity,
there would be no need for a full employment bill..
Nienstaedt is also worried about another problem. He be-
lieves that any government assurance of full employment is in-
compatible with 'the right to sfrike and the fundamental free-
dom of the individual'.
I believe that Woytinsky's as well as Nienstaedt's doubts can
be met by distinguishing, as I suggested, between full employ-
ment opportunities and actual full employment. Full employ-
ment opportunity means that there is a job for each person in
the labor force. Some persons in the labor force may still not
actually get a job because of regional discrepancies, discrepan-
cies in skill and training, differences in wage scales offered and
wages demanded, or for other reasons. 'Good' employment,
which Woytinsky wishes to measure, should comprehend all
factors that affect job opportunities as well as actual employ-
ment. For purposes of analysis, and even more important, for
purposes of government policies, it is, however, of utmost im-
portance to distinguish between employment opportunities and
actual employment. There are opportunities even though some
workers must migrate or retrain or settle their conflict with
management before the opportunity can materialize.
1ff correctly understand the purposes of the 'full employ-
ment' bill, it is intended to assure the creation of sufficient job
opportunities but is not designed to guarantee actual em-
ployment for everybody. Limiting the assurance of the govern-
ment that full employment opportunities will exist does not
mean, however, that the government does not also have the
responsibility of helping to overcome the discrepancies between
jobs offered and sought and labor-management conflicts. It is,
I believe, desirable to develop methods to measure employment
opportunities as well as actual employment. There is probably
not any one single set of figures that can adequately measure
both employment opportunities and actual employment.
Various Types of Projection. Copeland emphasizes quite cor-
rectly that various types of policy formulation require various
types of projection, covering short, intermediate, and long
periods. In addition —andthis is very significant —hesug-
gests that possible patterns of economic development beCOMMENT 127
sketchedas a basis for preparing programs for actual use when
needed.
Copeland's remarks can help to clarify some aspects of the
discussion that was initiated by Hagen's presentation of a set of
estimates. These estimates, which were prepared immediately
after VJ Day, were, I believe, valuable for illustrating methodo-
logical problems and for demonstrating possible patterns of
economic development in the reconversion and post-reconver-
sion period. The projections showed that in the period of re-
stocking and reequipping, inflationary pressures may prevail
although current incomes are expected to decline. These pro-
jections suggest the need for preparing policies to deal with this
particular type of inflation as well as prepare plans for meeting
deflationary tendencies after the end of the restocking and re-
equipping boom.
The fact that the number of unemployed estimated for the
reconversion period proved to be exaggerated should not be
minimized and should teach a valuable lesson. I do not believe,
however, that the errors in the short run prove that the patterns
of economic development indicated for the intermediate and
long run periods are necessarily wrong. Woytinsky questions
the method presented by Hagen, the patterns of economic de-
velopment, and the policy conclusions suggested by these pro-
jections. He may or may not be right. He believes that "to
appraise the method it is enough to compare the figures in these
tables for the fourth quarter of 1945 with the actual level of un-
employment as revealed by the Bureau of the Census monthly
surveys". This, I believe, is not a valid conclusion. The fact
that the unemplyyment estimates of these projections were
exaggerated for the first part of the transition period proves
very little for the real controversy concerning the method of
projections and the probable patterns of development. This
experience does prove, however, the validity of Copeland's
point that the significance and limitation of each projection
with fespecttopermissible policy conclusions should be
-emphasized.
MR. HAGEN
If two football teams meet, during the first postwar season, with
many changes in. their line-ups by 'reèonversioh' bf the128 PART II
college population, and if two individuals bet upon the outcome
of the game, One will be more nearly correct than the other,
barring a tie. It would be unwise, however, to conclude that
this individual possesses a superior procedure for judging the
results of all future games between the two teams.
Similarly, Mr. Woytinsky's conclusions concerning the Na-
non's Budget method of forecasting economic conditions con-
stitute a drastic jump from limited premises. The evidence
consists of a non-random sample of one forecast. To draw con-
clusions concerning a population consisting of all future fore-
casts —asMr. Woytinsky does —isunwarranted.
One specific point in Mr. Woytinsky's analysis should be
noted before his general criticism is commented on. I do not
understand his statement that regression lines necessarily —
Mr.Woytinsky says "always" —indicatethat the nation is
heading toward deep depression and mass unemployment. A
given set of regression lines may indicate this. Another may not.
Almost any systematic relationship can appropriately be ex-
pressed by a regression equation. To deny the validity or
relevance of regression equations is substantially to deny that
systematic relationships exist between the variables. I think
that Mr. Woytinsky would not deny that relationships exist,
for instance, between consumer disposable income and con-
sumer expenditures. He has repeatedly used regression lines to
relate these variables.' Since he therefore obviously does be-
lieve in the use of regression equations for purposes relevant to
the present discussion, his statement here seems meaningless.
It is worth while noting that as it stands it is obviously in error.
Mr. Woytinsky begins his criticism of logic of the Na-
tion s Budget method by stating that by itfuture unemploy-
ment is calculated as the difference between labor force and
employment" and therefore is subject to wide errors. The state-
ment is correct —butI do not know of any other method of
forecasting unemployment.
The margin of error in any forecast of unemployment is due
not to the use of a particular method but to the nature of un-
employment as a small final residual in a chain of causation.
'See, e.g.,W. S. Woytinsky, 'Relationship between Consumer Expenditures, Savings,
and Disposable Income', Review of Economic Statistics, XXVIII, 1, Feb. 1946.COMMENT 129
Unemployment arises because job opportunities are less numer-
ous than job seekers. The number of job opportunities depends
upon the level of output. Small variations in forecasting the
level of output, plus small errors in forecasting the level of em-
ployment that will be associated with any given level of output
may result in percentage errors in forecasting employment that
will be far greater percentage errors in forecasting unemploy-
ment. A forecast of unemployment by no matter what method
is subject to large percentage error for this reason. Since Mr.
Woytinsky himself bases his forecast of unemployment on one
of output and therefore implicitly of employment (see the last
page of his criticism above), there would seem to be no valid
basis for his criticism of this aspect of the Nation's Budget
method.
The Nation's Budget method of forecasting is simply a syste-
matic procedure for adjusting estimates of consumer expendi-
tures, government purchases of goods and services, and com-
ponents of private capital formation, so that they will be
mutually consistent. Obviously, the level of government ex-
penditures and revenues and the level of private capital forma-
tion are partial determinants of the level of total output and
income. Equally obviously, the level of consumer expenditures
depends upon the level of total income, though not upon that
alone. Again, the levels of various components of private capital
formation depend in part upon consumer expenditures. The
Nation's Budget method is merely a simple method of making
clear the relation between component estimates, so that an
explicit basis exists for judging their mutual consistency. Fol-
lowing a procedure that makes this possible is in my judgment
an important improvement in forecasting techniques.
However, it remains true that the method determines the
levels of output, income, employment, and unemployment
which are forecast, only so far as it reveals inconsistencies. The
estimates depend in the first instance upon judgments and data
that are independent of the method used.
Mr. Woytinsky would reject this systematic procedure for
checking inconsi&tencies, and would substitute a "direct analy-
sis of future economic conditions, emphasizing qualitative
characteristics of prevailing trends". I do not understand what
he means. He clearly does not propose estimating unemploy-0
130 PART.II
ment or employment directly, without regard for the level. di
output. I hardly think ih&t he means that each component of
output should be estimated independently. of every other com-
ponent. It. therefore seems probable that his statement consti-
tutes merely an expression of the opinion that his judgment at
VJ Day concerning coming conditions was better than that of
persons who were using the Nation's Budget method. Concern-
ing this I have no comment to offer. I would merely note that
it is not relevant to the question whether the Nation's Budget
method is a useful one, and therefore that Mr. Woytinsky's
criticism in the main is irrelevant.